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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Rafael Galvan appeals from a judgment of conviction for first degree stalking and 
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon enhancement, entered after a jury trial. On 
appeal, Mr. Galvan argues that the prosecutor violated Mr. Galvan's state right and 
federal right to remain silent and his federal right to due process when, in closing, he 
argued that the jury could use Mr. Galvan's post-arrest, post-Miranda 1 silence as 
evidence of his guilt. Mr. Galvan also argues that his sentences are excessively harsh. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In docket number 40223, Mr. Galvan was charged, by Information, with 
aggravated assault and a deadly weapon enhancement. (R., pp.15-16.) In docket 
number 40224, Mr. Galvan was charged, by Information, with stalking in the first 
degree. (R., pp.89-90.) 
The bases for these charges are set forth by the following statements which were 
elicited during the jury trial. After twenty three years of marriage, Ms. and Mr. Galvan 
began having marital issues and the couple separated. (05/14/11 Tr., p.178, L.11 -
p.180, L.6.) A few weeks after they separated, Ms. Galvan obtained a civil protection 
order which prohibited Mr. Galvan from contacting Ms. Galvan. (05/14/12 Tr., p.180, 
Ls.4-21.) 
Ms. Galvan testified that on various occasions Mr. Galvan began following her in 
his car while she was driving home from work. (05/14/12 Tr., p.193, Ls.5-25.) 
Ms. Galvan testified that in August of 2011, he followed her to a store and spoke with 
1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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her. (05/14/12 Tr., p.194, L.12 - p.195, L.7.) Ms. Galvan then began driving home and 
Mr. Galvan followed her. (05/14/12 Tr., p.194, L.8 - p.196, L.11.) 
Ms. Galvan testified that during the first week of October 2011, she was driving 
home from work and noticed Mr. Galvan was in his car and passed her. (05/14/12 
Tr., p.204, Ls.7-17.) Ms. Galvan then testified that she passed him, and he then passed 
her, and that this pattern of repeated passing continued for a period of time. (05/14/12 
Tr., p.204, L.18 - p.205, L.8.) 
Officer Broderick testified that, in October of 2011, he responded to a call 
involving two vehicles. (05/14/12 Tr., p.164, L.11 - p.165, L.1.) According to Officer 
Broderick, he was following Mr. Galvan and that Mr. Galvan was following Ms. Galvan 
who was driving in her car. (05/14/12 Tr., p.169, L.14 - p.170, L.3.) Mr. Galvan was 
eventually arrested for violating a civil protection order prohibiting him from being within 
300 feet of Ms. Galvan. (05/14/12 Tr., p.172, Ls.7-10, p.174, Ls.5-10.) 
Ms. Galvan also testified that on an afternoon in January of 2012 she arrived at 
work early because she had to pay some bills. (05/14/12 Tr., p.225, L.23 - p.226, L.17.) 
Ms. Galvan was parked in her car, which was located in her employer's parking lot, 
Melaleuca, when she noticed Mr. Galvan's truck. (05/14/12 Tr., p.226, L.21 - p.227, 
LA.) Mr. Galvan asked her if they could resume their relationship and Ms. Galvan told 
him no. (05/14/12 Tr., p.227, L.5 - p.228, L.7.) According to Ms. Galvan, Mr. Galvan 
told her that he was going to kill her and himself and pulled out a gun. (05/14/12 
Tr., p.228, L.8 - p.229, L.9.) Ms. Galvan testified that she eventually talked Mr. Galvan 
out of his decision to kill them both. (05/14/12 Tr., p.230, Ls.14-24.) 
Alicia Luna, Ms. Galvan's co-worker, testified that she was parked in her car in 
the Melaleuca parking lot. (05/14/12 Tr., p.110, L.15 - p.112, L.12.) She noticed that 
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Mr. Galvan was speaking to a person in a car. (05/14/12 Tr., p.113, L.21 - p.115, L.3.) 
At first, Ms. Luna thought everything was normal and she put on some headphones and 
started listening to music. (05/14/12 Tr., p.115, Ls.4-6.) Ms. Luna said that she noticed 
that Mr. Galvan pull out a gun and point it into the air and then pointed the gun down. 
(05/14/12 Tr., p.115, Ls.6-10, p.116, Ls.19-25.) Ms. Luna also testified that she could 
not hear any words being spoken and she couldn't see the person in the car. (05/14/12 
Tr., p.115, L.17 - p.117, L.15.) 
Charity Schuldt, Ms. Galvan's supervisor, testified that she had been informed by 
Ms. Luna that a "situation" was occurring in the Melaleuca parking lot. (05/14/12 
Tr., p.141, Ls. 7-17.) Ms. Schuldt then called 911 and while on the phone walked toward 
the direction of Mr. Galvan. (05/14/12 Tr., p.141, Ls.13-19, p.149, Ls.1-10.) 
Ms. Schuldt testified that she observed Mr. Galvan bring his hand up "as if to throw 
something" and then he got into his truck. (05/14/12 Tr., p.155, Ls.16-23.) Ms. Schuldt 
testified that she never saw a gun in Mr. Galvan's hand. (05/14/12 Tr., p.155, Ls.9-25.) 
Approximately four hours later, Mr. Galvan was arrested at his home. (05/15/12 
Tr., p.58, L.21 - p.60, L.9, p.63, L.14 - p.64, L.22.) Mr. Galvan was read Miranda 
warnings and began making admissions to the police. (05/15/12 Tr., p.62, Ls.1-6, p.63, 
Ls.12-22.) According to the arresting officer, however, Mr. Galvan would not respond 
when asked if he threatened Ms. Galvan with a gun.2 (05/15/12 Tr., p.62, Ls.7-9.) 
During the State's closing, the prosecutor argued that Mr. Galvan never denied having a 
gun when was asked by the police, and that the jury could use Mr. Galvan's silence as 
to that question as evidence that he did, in fact, threaten Ms. Galvan with a gun. 
(05/15/12 Tr., p.93, L.23 - p.94, L.6.) 
3 
The jury ultimately convicted Mr. Galvan on both counts and the deadly weapon 
enhancement. (R., pp.25, 40-41,111-112.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a 
unified sentence of ten years, with one and one-half years fixed, for aggravated assault 
and the deadly weapons enhancement. (R., pp.48-49.) The district court imposed a 
concurrent sentence of four years, with one and one-half years fixed, for stalking in the 
first degree. (R., pp.119-120.) Mr. Galvan timely appealed both cases. (R., pp.53-55, 
122-124.) 
2 Mr. Galvan testified that he affirmatively denied having a gun when he was questioned 
by the police after being Mirandized. (05/15/12 Tr., p.76, Ls.11-15.) 
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ISSUES 
1) Did the prosecuting attorney violate Mr. Galvan's state right and federal right to 
remain silent and his federal right to due process when, without objection, he 
commented on Mr. Galvan's post-arrest, post Miranda silence during his closing 
argument? 
2) Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
ten years, with one and one-half years fixed, for aggravated assault and the 
deadly weapons enhancement and a concurrent sentence of four years, with one 




The Prosecuting Attorney Violated Mr. Galvan's State Right And Federal Right To 
Remain Silent And His Federal Right To Due Process When, Without Objection, He 
Commented On Mr. Galvan's Post-Arrest, Post Miranda Silence During His Closing 
Argument 
A. Introduction 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, UNo person 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]" U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. Similarly, the Idaho Constitution guarantees that U[n]o person shall ... be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]" Id. CONST. art. I § 13. 
Mr. Galvan asserts that it was fundamental error in violation of his state and 
federal rights when the prosecutor, without objection, argued that the jury could use 
Mr. Galvan's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence as evidence of his guilt. Consistent with 
this Court's recent decision in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (Idaho 2010), because the 
comment was not followed by contemporaneous objections, Mr. Galvan must satisfy a 
three-prong test in order to prevail on appeal. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. 
8. The Three-Prong Test Under Perry 
The standard of review for unobjected to error set forth in Perry is as follows: 
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it 
shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental 
error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the 
defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless. If the 
defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error 
satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and 
remand. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. 
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1. Mr. Galvan's Claim Of Error Meets The First Prong Of The Perry 
Fundamental Error Standard As An Alleged Violation Of His State Right 
And Federal Right To Remain Silent And His Federal Right To Due 
Process Are Of Constitutional Magnitude 
The first prong of the Perry analysis is that "the defendant must demonstrate that 
one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated. Perry, 150 
Idaho at 226. The Idaho Supreme Court recently published an opinion, which was 
published after Perry that held comments about a defendant's post-Miranda silence for 
the sale purpose of inferring guilt violates the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011). According to the Ellington Court: 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as 
well as Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee a criminal 
defendant the right not to be compelled to testify against himself. U.S. 
Canst. amends. V, XIV; Idaho Canst. art. I, § 13. The U.S. Supreme Court 
has interpreted this right also to bar the prosecution from commenting on 
a defendant's invocation of that right. In the case of post-arrest silence, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has provided guidance as to when and how that 
silence can and cannot be used by the State at trial. First, because of the 
promise present in a Miranda warning, a prosecutor may not use evidence 
of post-arrest, post- Miranda silence for either impeachment ... or as 
substantive evidence of guilt in the State's case-in-chief .... A prosecutor 
may use evidence of pre- Miranda silence, either pre- or post-arrest, for 
impeachment of the defendant. 
Id. at 60. (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). In order to establish that Mr. Galvan's 
state and federal constitutional rights were violated, he must prove that the post-arrest, 
post-Miranda comments on his silence were used solely for the purpose of inferring guilt 
and not used as impeachment evidence. 
The United State Supreme Court has also held that a prosecutor's comments on 
a defendant's right to remain silent offend the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976), the Supreme Court reasoned that 
when a defendant remains silent after receiving Miranda warnings that silence is 
ambiguous and "may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda 
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rights." The Doyle Court then held that when a defendant receives Miranda warnings 
from law enforcement the defendant also receives an implicit guarantee that his or her 
silence will not be used against him or her or otherwise carry a penalty. Id. at 618. As 
such, "it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the 
arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at 
triaL" Id. 
As stated above the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that there is an 
impeachment exception to the holding in Doyle. See Ellington, supra. In State v. 
Dougherty, 142 Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 2005), the Idaho Court of Appeals has also 
commented on the impeachment exception to Doyle. In that case, the Court of Appeals 
held that in some instances it is appropriate for a prosecutor to elicit testimony on cross 
examination in order to impeach a defendant's inconsistent testimony. Id. at 5. 
However, even if a comment on silence is initially elicited for appropriate impeachment 
purposes, the federal constitution sill prohibits the prosecutor in the same trial to argue 
that the defendant's silence can be used by the jury to infer guilt. Id. at 5. In other 
words, even after a defendant opens the door and allows the prosecutor to ask 
questions about the defendant's silence that testimony can only be used for the limited 
purpose of impeachment. 
Now turning to the facts of this case, the State began its closing argument by 
generally explaining to the jury that its role is to weigh the credibility of the various 
witnesses' testimony. (05/15/12 Tr., p.90, L.18 - p.93, L.5.) The State then made the 
following comments: 
So one of the things that we look at in our everyday dealings 
deciding whether to believe something or not is the motive of the person 
that is making the statement. You look at what kind of an interest that 
person has in the statement. 
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There are just so many factors that you use on your daily lives to 
determine whether someone is being truthful or not. 
In this particular case, again, you have Alicia Luna that is a 
completely independent witness, only works with Ms. Galvan. Basically 
was not friends with her, necessarily, just coworkers. And they didn't even 
discuss the event after it happened. 
You look at Ms. Schuldt. She didn't see the gun. But Ms. Schuldt 
heard the arguing and walked away and then later determined there was a 
problem. 
Mr. Galvan . . . has a great interest in the outcome of this case. 
Mr. Galvan, although given the opportunity when confronted by Deputy 
Summers to deny that he pulled a gun on Ms. Galvan, failed to do so. 
It would appear that a reasonable person being accused of 
something like that would, in fact, adamantly state that it never happened 
if, in fact. it did not happen. 
(05/15/12 Tr., p.93, L.6 - p.94, L.6 (emphasis added).) In this case, the prosecutor's 
closing argument did not attempt to impeach Mr. Galvan'S credibility. Instead, the 
prosecutor expressly stated that Mr. Galvan's silence can be used to infer guilt because 
a reasonable person who was innocent would adamantly deny guilt when confronted 
about a crime by the police. As such, the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
commenting on Mr. Galvan's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence and then expressly 
drawing the constitutionally prohibited inference that his silence can be used by the jury 
as evidence of his guilt. Therefore, Mr. Galvan has established the first prong of the 
Perry fundamental error standard because he has established an error of constitutional 
magnitude. 
In the event, this Court determines that Mr. Galvan somehow opened the door for 
the State to use his post-arrest, post-Miranda silence against him, the State's comments 
in closing still violated Mr. Galvan'S constitutional rights. As stated above, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals held that even in situations where the defendant has put his or her 
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post-arrest, post-Miranda silence at issue, the State is limited in closing to arguing that 
silence for impeachment purposes. Dougherty, 142 Idaho at 5. In other words, the 
State is still prohibited from arguing that a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence 
can be used to infer guilt even in instances where the defendant had opened the door 
by commenting on his or her silence. Since the only use for Mr. Galvan's silence was to 
infer guilt, the State violated Mr. Galvan's constitutional rights. 
2. Mr. Galvan's Claim of Error Meets The Second Prong Of The Perry 
Fundamental Error Standard As The Alleged Violation Of His State Right 
And Federal Right To Remain Silent And His Federal Right To Due 
Process Is Clear Or Obvious 
The second prong of the Perry analysis is that "the error must be clear or 
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate 
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. The error at issue is clear and obvious because the law on this 
subject is very clear and leaves virtually not room for ambiguity. The State cannot 
comment on a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence. As mentioned above, this 
rule is still applicable in the event the defendant opens the door allowing the State to 
use silence for impeachment purposes. 
There could be no tactical reason for defense counsel's failure to object because 
the State was so clear that it wanted the jury to infer from Mr. Galvan'S silence that he 
was guilty. On the other hand, there could be a tactical reason to avoid objecting in 
circumstances where the State mentions a defendant's silence in passing and leaves it 
up to the jury to draw the unconstitutional inference. Under those circumstances, 
defense counsel might be unsure whether the jury would draw the unconstitutional 
inference and decide to refrain from objecting to avoid drawing attention to the 
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comment. In the present matter, the State clearly argued in closing that Mr. Galvan's 
silence should be used as evidence of his guilt. Since the State did not leave it up to 
the jury to draw the unconstitutional inference, an objection by the defense and an 
appropriate ruling by the court would have only reduced the prejudicial impact of the 
State's comment as opposed to exacerbating its effect. 
3. Mr. Galvan's Claim Of Error Meets The Third Prong Of The Perry 
Fundamental Error Standard As The Alleged Violation OF His State And 
Federal Right To Remain Silent And His Federal Right To Due Process 
Affected His Substantial Rights 
The third prong of the Perry analysis is that "the defendant must demonstrate 
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) 
that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." Perry, 150 Idaho at 
226. Mr. Galvan can establish that the State's comments on his silence affected the 
outcome of the trial due to the weaknesses in the State's case and the fact that the 
determination of Mr. Galvan'S guilt turned almost entirely on the credibility of 
Mr. Galvan'S testimony vis-a-vis the creditability of the State's witnesses. 
One of the weaknesses in the State's case was its inability to produce the gun at 
trial and that Ms. Galvan's testimony that Mr. Galvan had given away his guns before 
the events that occurred in the Melalueca parking lot. (05/15/12 Tr., p.60, L.19 - p.61, 
L.S, p.63, Ls.3-S, p.44, L.7 - p.46, L.5.) 
The foregoing weakness is amplified because the only evidence in the record 
tending to indicate that Mr. Galvan had a gun was the conflicting testimony of 
Ms. Galvan and Ms. Luna. Ms. Schuldt observed the majority of the conversation 
between Mr. and Ms. Galvan, but never saw a gun. (05/14/12 Tr., p.154, Ls.10-17, 
p.155, Ls.9-25.) Ms. Luna testified that Mr. Galvan pulled out a gun and then he 
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pointed it up and then pointed it down and "it seemed like he was pointing it at the 
person in the car." (05/14/12 Tr., p.115, LsA-10, p.116, Ls.16-25.) However, 
Ms. Galvan also testified that Mr. Galvan held the gun down and never raised it into the 
air and never pointed it at Ms. Galvan. (05/15/12 Tr., p.9, L.12 - p.1 0, L.2.) Ms. Galvan 
also testified that she did not understand how Ms. Luna saw the gun as Mr. Galvan 
never raised it into the air and he kept it down in order to hide it from other people. 
(05/15/12 Tr., pA2, Ls.18-25.) It is important to note that both Ms. Luna and 
Ms. Galvan testified that they observed Mr. Galvan pull out a gun. (05/14/12 Tr., p.115, 
LsA-10; 05/15/12 Tr., pA9, Ls.5-18, p.50, L.19 - p.51, L.25.) This is important because 
they were describing the same event, i.e. the moment Mr. Galvan allegedly pulled out 
the gun, and came up with entirely different explanations of that event, which calls into 
question the veracity of their testimony. The creditability of these conflicting stories is 
further undermined due to the unique nature of the event. It is very uncommon for a 
person to pull out a gun in a threatening manner in the middle of the day. If this event 
actually occurred, the witnesses would not easily forget how it transpired. 
In sum, Mr. Galvan can establish the third prong of the Perry fundamental error 
standard. The only evidence the State provided was the conflicting testimony of 
Ms. Galvan and Ms. Luna. Since Mr. Galvan denied threatening Ms. Galvan with a gun 
(05/15/12 Tr., p.72, Ls.16-18), the question of Mr. Galvan's guilt turned on the credibility 
of Mr. Galvan versus the State's witnesses. In closing, the State argued that a 
reasonable person being accused of threatening a person with a gun, given the 
opportunity, would "adamantly state that it never happened if, in fact, it did not happen." 
Not only did that use of Mr. Galvan's silence undermine Mr. Galvan's credibility, but it 
also undermined his credibility as to the key question before the jury, i.e. whether or not 
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Mr. Galvan was being honest when he testified that he did not threaten Ms. Galvan with 
a gun. Therefore, Mr. Galvan has established that the prosecutor's comments about his 
post-arrest, post-Miranda silence did affect the outcome of the trial proceedings. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten 
Years, With One And One-Half Years Fixed, For Aggravated Assault And The Deadly 
Weapons Enhancement And A Concurrent Sentence Of Four Years, With One And 
One-Half Years Fixed, For Stalking In The First Degree 
Mr. Galvan asserts that, given any view of the facts, his are excessive. Where a 
defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, 
the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving 
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Galvan does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Galvan must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
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As a preliminary note, the presentence investigator concluded that a period of 
retained jurisdiction would be the most appropriate outcome for Mr. Galvan. 
(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.11-12.) 
There are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that 
Mr. Galvan's sentences are excessive. Specifically, Mr. Galvan has a minimal criminal 
record. (PSI, pp.4-5.) Prior to the actions which lead up to the instant offenses, 
Mr. Galvan's record consisted of an infraction for failure to use a safety restraint and a 
dismissed charge for failing to provide proof of insurance. (PSI, pp.4-5.) This is a very 
minimal criminal record for an adult that is forty seven years old. (PSI, p.1.) Mr. Galvan 
told his mental health evaluator that "other than a few traffic violations, he never had 
issues with the law like he presently has until about June 2011, when he believed his 
wife was engaging in an affair with a coworker and he confronted her about it." (19-
2524 Examination Report, p.1 (attached to PSI).) The fact that Mr. Galvan's only 
serious criminal behavior was associated with the dissolution of his marriage is 
important because, at sentencing, Mr. Galvan'S counsel indicated that "he has finally 
come to the determination he doesn't want anything to do with his former spouse .... " 
(07/24/12 Tr., p.15, Ls.13-15.) Counsel also stated that "I think he understands that .. . 
no good will come of trying to contact her, and he doesn't want to." (07/24/12 Tr., p.15, 
Ls.17-19.) If Mr. Galvan has decided that he will not have anything to do with his former 
spouse then he poses virtually no risk to society because all of his criminal behavior 
was derived from the breakdown of that relationship. 
Mr. Galvan is a family man and despite the instant offenses, Mr. Galvan was 
allowed to have supervised visitation with his children. (PSI, p.11.) 
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Mr. Galvan is amenable to rehabilitation. According to his mental health 
evaluator, Mr. Galvan would likely complete a domestic violence prevention class if 
ordered "with little resistance." Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment, p.6 
(attached to PSI).) 
Mr. Galvan's work employment history is also a mitigating factor. Mr. Galvan 
earned his GED. (PSI, p.8.) Mr. Galvan also owned his own roofing business for a 
period of six years. (PSI, p.8; Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment, p.3 (attached 
to PSI).) 
In sum, Mr. Galvan is a law abiding citizen that suffered a total emotional 
breakdown when his wife of twenty three years started having an affair and wanted to 
end their marriage. This does not excuse his behavior. However, it does put it into 
context. Since Mr. Galvan no longer wants to rectify his relationship with his former 
spouse, he has no further reason to engage in the type of behavior which led the 
underlying convictions. This, in turn, means that Mr. Galvan poses a very low threat to 




Mr. Galvan respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction, and remand this matter to the district court for a new trial. Alternatively, 
Mr. Galvan respectfully requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate portions of his 
sentences. 
DATED this 6th day of June, 2013. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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